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HUMAN FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH RUNWAY INCURSIONS 
Charles E. Billings and Dolores B. O'Hara 
Introduction 
Though few aircraft collisions have occurred on or immediately above runways at controlled 
airports, incidents involving incursions of aircraft or surface vehicles into aircraft movement areas 
have been a continuing source of concern t o  those responsible for management of the national 
aviation system. In response t o  requests from the National Transportation Safety Board and the 
Federal Aviation Administration, a study has been conducted of ASRS reports relating to such 
incursions. This study was not designed to provide quantitative data regarding the prevalence of 
such occurrences; rather, it was focused on the behavioral aspects of potential and actual conflicts 
on controlled airports. The reports which were used in the study were submitted between July 1, 
1976 and June 30, 1978, a period of 24 months. This report is a summary of the findings to date in 
the study, which is continuing. A final report will be published separately. 
Approach 
Dinzertsions of the stud.v- 'The stiidy examined 165 potential conflicts, actual conflicts, and 
situations which under other circumstances could have resulted in conflicts on or immediately 
above the aircraft movement areas of controlled airports in North America. The search of the ASRS 
data base was not inclusive for such events; it is known that not all reports relating to or describing 
such events were retrieved by the search strategies employed. Nonetheless, enough relevant reports 
were retrieved to permit a systematic stiidy of the characteristics and dynamics of such occurrences. 
Chtegorization of occirrrences- Each report was categorized as t o  each of the following 
characteristics : 
1.  Month of occurrence 
2. Location 
3. Reporter 
4. Types of aircraft involved 
5. Types of operation involved 
6. Phase of flight 
7. By whom the occurrence was initiated 
8. Occurrence type 
9. Type of conflict 
IO. Outcome of occurrence 
I 1. BY wIiGm recovery was initiated 
12. Recovery actions by each participant 
13. Enabling factors 
These categories art' defined and explained as they are discussed. All occiirrences were assumed to 
involve Iiuman error; although there were a few cases in  which mechanical or environlncntal factors 
were important, the assumption provcd to  be generally valid. 
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Analysis of the data- All reports were categorized as described above. After the categorizations 
were checked for accuracy, the reports were re-read and enabling factors were added. The analysis 
thereafter was designed to examine associations among descriptive and enabling factors, with the 
hope of answering the following questions for as many occurrences as possible: 
Air transport/air transport 
Air transport/general aviation 
1. Where did the event occur? When? What happened? 
2. What errors, by whom, contributed to the occurrence? 
3. What were the characteristics of the occurrence? 
4. Who first recognized the problem? How was recovery effected? 
5. What factors were associated with the occurrence? In particular, did certain human or  
system factors tend to be associated with particular occurrence characteristics? 
41 
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Results 
Initial evaluation of the reports indicated that 30 of the 165 occurrences involved no conflict. 
This category was assigned when only one aircraft was involved in the occurrence; there was no 
potential conflict with another aircraft or vehicle because there was no other vehicle in the vicinity. 
The remaining 135 reports did involve a threatened or actual conflict. 
Month of occurrence- Somewhat more reports were noted during spring, summer and fall 
months than during the winter. The differences were not striking. 
Locutions- The 165 occurrences took place at 7 3  different locations. Five or more occur- 
rences were reported at nine hub airports. Specific location data will be discussed in the final report 
of this study. 
Reporters- Pilots and crewmembers provided 66% of  the occurrence reports; con trollers 
reported 32%; other persons provided 2%. 
Types of operatiom- While a simple listing cannot fully account for operational types in those 
cases involving more than two aircraft or vehicles, table 1 shows types of operations, where known, 
for the 135 cases involving a potential or  actual conflict between aircraft. 
TABLE 1.- TYPES OF OPERATIONS I N  CONFLICT OCCURRENCES 
I Operator classes in conflict occurrence 1 Number of occurrences 
Air transport/military o r  government 
Air transport/other or unknown 
General avistion/general aviation 
General aviation/military or government 
Gttneral aviation/other or  unknown 
Other or  unknown/other or unknown 
3 
36 
7 
2 
13 
4 
I35 
--
3 
Initiators of occurrence- As noted above, it was assumed that all these Occurrences ‘involved 
human error. The person believed by the authors to be responsible for the initial error associated 
with the occurrence was the controller in 54% of 165 occurrences, the pilot in 39% of the 
occurrences, and the operator of a surface vehicle in 4% of  the occurrences. In five cases (3%), the 
data did not permit categorization. 
Hold Taxi 
0 6 
3 
Outcome- An occurrence was classed as a near collision if, in the opinion of the authors, two 
vehicles came perilously close to colliding. This, of course, depends on the size, type, and speed of 
the vehicles, as well as their relative courses, all of which were taken into account. Unless it was 
fairly certain that the event was a near collision, it was classified as “less than safe separation’’ if a 
conflict occurred, or “recognized error” if one or more persons recognized the problem and took 
action in sufficient time to prevent a conflict. Other cases were classified as “no conflict.” 
Takeoff Approach 
1 4 
21 8 
8 7 
1 
One occurrence involved a collision (wing tip with motor vehicle); 37 involved near collisions; 
50 involved less than safe separation. In 47 cases, the problem was recognized before a conflict 
occurred. There was no actual or threatened conflict in 30 cases, because no other aircraft or vehicle 
was in the vicinity. 
Land 
4 
14 
1 1  
1 
8 
P h s e  of flight- The flight (or ground operation) phases for the two aircraft principally 
involved in aircraft/aircraft conflicts are shown in table 2 for all cases in which two aircraft were 
involved and in which both phases were known. 
Other 
0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
TABLE 2.- PHASE O F  FLIGHT AT TIME O F  OCCURRENCE 
Flight phase, 
aircraft 2 
Hold 
Taxi 
Takeoff 
Approach 
Land 
Other 
a Figures are percentages of sample. 
It  is worth noting that the two most frequent categories for both pilot- and controller-initiated 
incidents were taxi/takeoff and taxi/land. The other major categories were takeoff/land, takeoff/ 
takeoff, land/land, and taxi/approach. 
Occitrrence types- The 135 occurrences which involved conflicts were classified as shown in 
table 3. The data art: sumniarized for occurrences initiated by pilots and by controllers. 
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TABLE 3.- RUNWAY INCURSIONS: OCCURRENCE TYPES 
Pilot occurrences 
Lack of clearance to: 
Cross a runway 33% 
Take off 23 
Land 6 
Taxi t o  ramp 2 
Disorientation/confusion 2 1 
Confusion about clearance 2 
Other 13 
100% 
Con troller occurrences 
Failure to  insure separation: 
Intersecting 47% 
In trail 24 
Other 12 
Confusion 9 
Lack of information 4 
Late clearance change 3 
Other 1 
100% 
Recognition of problem- The problem was first recognized and recovery action initiated, by a 
pilot in 50% of 135 cases; recognition was by a controller in 25% of the cases. Simultaneous 
recognition and action by controller and pilot occurred in 3%; there was no  recognition of the 
problem in time to take recovery action in 2076, and in 2% of the cases the data were inadequate to 
permit categorization. 
Enabling and associated factors- The factors that were assigned t o  reports containing enough 
data to permit such analysis, together with their frequency of occurrence in events believed to have 
been initiated by pilots and controllers, are shown in table 4. As many factors as were believed 
pertinent were assigned to each occurrence. 
Occurrences initiated by drivers and those in which the initiators of the occurrence could not 
be determined are not included in table 4. 
It should not be inferred that the factors in table 4 are inclusive of all factors pertinent t o  the 
cases under study, nor should it be inferred that each factor listed was necessarily causal in the 
occurrences. Rather, the factors listed are in the best judgment of the authors, pertinent to the 
occurrences, based on the information available in the reports. 
It is interesting to note certain apparent anomalies in the list. Controller technique was cited as 
a factor in nine reports in which a pilot error apparently initiated the occurrence. Similarly, pilot 
technique was cited in 11 controller error reports. These findings and certain others like them are 
discussed below. 
The enabling and associated factors were partitioned by occurrence type and outcome in an 
effort to  find whether certain types of occurrence, or certain outcomes, are associated with 
particular human and system factors. The results of these analyses are discussed below. 
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TABLE 4.- ENABLING/ASSOCIATED FACTORS IN RUNWAY INCURSIONS: 
65 OCCURRENCES INITIATED BY PILOT, 89 BY CONTROLLERS 
Factor 
Coordination problem in cockpit 
Coordination problem between 
Coordination problem within tower 
Coordination problem between tower 
Phraseology 
Language problem 
Frequency congestion 
Similar flight numbers 
Con troller technique 
Pilot technique 
Intersection takeoff 
Landing t o  hold short of intersection 
Airport lighting and markings 
Airport, other factors including staff 
ATC and controller procedures 
Pilo tlflight procedures 
Training in progress 
Environment (weather) 
Workload 
Fatigue 
Other factors 
aircraft and ATC 
and approach control 
Total factors 
Occurrence initiated by: 
Pilot 
1 1  
17 
3 
1 
3 
3 
3 
1 
9 
43 
2 
0 
4 
3 
3 
7 
0 
4 
3 
0 
0 
120 
Controller 
0 
19 
29 
8 
2 
1 
3 
0 
61 
1 1  
4 
2 
3 
7 
8 
1 
5 
6 
2 
1 
2 
175 
-
Discussion 
Introdircfory cotnments- Unplanned incursions onto aircraft movement areas represent a 
serious potential threat to system integrity. In this sample of occurrences, 82% represented at least a 
potential conflict; there was an actual conflict in 5370, a near collision in 22%, and an actual 
collision in 1%. Air carrier aircraft were involved in 81% of the potential and actual conflicts. 
Virtually all the occurrences involved human error. In at least 1396, both controller and pilot 
errors were involved. I n  65 occurrences initiated by pilot actions, 64% involved a lack Of clearance 
to  perform some maneuver. Eighty-three percent of the 89 occurrences initiated by controller 
action involved a failure to  insure separation. 
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There was no difference between the two groups with respect to outcome: 22% of both pilot- 
and controller-initiated occurrences resulted in a near-collision. 
There is no question (table 3) that a substantial majority of both pilot- and controller-initiated 
occurrences involved deficiencies in technique. Failure t o  obtain a clearance, for whatever reason, is 
a deficiency in pilot technique; failure to maintain assured separation, for whatever reason, is a 
deficiency in controller technique. It is hardly surprising, then, that the most commonly cited 
enabling/associated factor in table 4 is a technique deficiency. This citation. however, is hardly 
enlightening unless accompanied by information that suggests why the break in technique may have 
occurred. The remainder of this analysis is devoted to this question. 
Pilot-initiated occurrences- Although pilot technique was involved in most of these occur- 
rences (43 of 65), it is necessary to ask what other factors were also present and pertinent to the 
event (table 4). One notes that coordination problems were cited 32 times; most of these involved 
within-cockpi t or cockpit-ATC coordination, though in 4 cases, there was an associated coordina- 
tion problem within ATC. 
Typical breakdowns in cockpit coordination are illustrated in the following examples. 
On taxi out, we were issued a clearance to taxi t o  runway 27L. Normal 
departure runways are 26 and 27R with landings on 26 and 27L. There is extensive 
airport construction which causes extensive diversions while taxiing. After crossing 
runway 26 we were given multiple taxi instructions during the process of running 
the taxi checklist. My attention was evidently diverted when we were given instruc- 
tions to  hold short of runway 27R. The first officer rogered. We were following 
another aircraft and as we approached 27R we were told t o  switch to  tower 
frequency. We did so as the aircraft ahead was crossing 27R. I hadn’t heard the 
instructions to hold short, nor had I heard the previous aircraft being cleared to  
cross. I continued t o  cross 27R, not thinking of it as an active landing runway, and 
the first officer didn’t caution me to stop.. . . My first knowledge that we were 
crossing an active runway came when, just as I was approaching the runway, I 
looked left and noticed an airliner on about a 1/4-mile final. I could have slammed 
on the brakes and stopped short of the runway, but feeling that I had plenty of time 
to cross and not wanting to  injure a flight attendant with the sudden stop, I 
siiiiultaneously asked the first officer if we had been issued clearance to  cross (he 
replied that we had not) and proceeded on across. The tower directed the airliner t o  
go around which I didn’t think was neccssary but from his vantage point I’m scire he 
acted according to his own best judgment. . . . 
In the following case, the initial portion of the taxi clearance was transmitted during rollout. 
As we have noted in earlier reports, both cockpit noise levels and flight crew workload are high at 
this time. ASRS reports continue t o  describe misunderstandings of clcaranccs delivered during tlus 
phase of flight. It appears that some controllers are not sufficiently aware of this problem. 
After landing on runway IOR, we were advised by tower to  turn off runway 
10R onto runway 5 and to hold short of runway 14. While decelerating the aircraft 
and turning off runway IOR, I failed t o  hear the instructions to hold short of 14. As 
we approached the intersection of runway 14, the first officer said “hold short.” and 
I stopped the aircraft short of the runway. We would have collided with another 
airline aircraft had not the first officer advised me t o  hold short. He later told me 
that he had also applied brakes. The major factor in this occurrence is that I failed to 
hear the clearance limitation. Also, I was not completely familiar with the closeness 
of runway 14, having never landed on 10R before. I am aware that affirmative 
clearance is required to cross a runway and would have stopped notwithstanding the 
failure to hear the clearance t o  hold short had the intersecting runway been clearly 
recognizable as a runway. 
Cockpit-ATC coordination problems usually involved either misunderstandings between pilots 
and controllers, inadequate information transfer, or nonstandard procedures or phraseology. 
The pilot of aircraft A had been issued clearance for takeoff on runway 27 
while taxiing out from the loading ramp. . . the A pilot had just completed engine 
start and was not yet on tower frequency when the clearance was given. The STOL 
aircraft was on another ramp approximately 250 f t  from the taxiway-runway inter- 
section normally used as the initial takeoff position by STOL aircraft. The instruc- 
tions which were seemingly received were that he was cleared for takeoff. He 
reached the intersection at approximately the same time as A started its takeoff roll. 
The tower immediately ordered B t o  clear the runway and A t o  abort his takeoff. 
Reaction was immediate and a collision was averted by a good margin. 
* * * 
. . . After push-back, I was cleared for taxi with the following phrase: “Cleared 
to  taxi runway 8 R  via Charlie4 and hold short of runway 8L.” The weather at the 
time was rain showers and an overhead thunderstorm. Runways were wet. After 
passing the “Bravo” complex and approaching taxiway C-4, we received further 
instructions, “go right on out there at Charlie4.” I interpreted this to mean that I 
was cleared to cross runway 8L  and proceed to 8R. However, as a precaution, I 
asked the copilot to  check. He was unable due to  frequency congestion. Prior to 
entering the runway, I checked visually and spotted aircraft B on short final for 
landing on runway 8L. A panic stop was initiated using brakes and reverse. Due to 
the wet conditions, the anti-skid cycled continuously. The aircraft was turned 
slightly to the right to present a smaller target t o  the landing aircraft. After we came 
to  a complete stop, the controller said something to the effect, “You stopped pretty 
close to the runway.” I repeated his previous instructions regarding going out on 
Charlie-4 and he replied, “I told you to  hold short. . . .” 
In one casc, it is questionable whether the pilot communicated his intentions, or whether he 
was affected by a wind shear late in the approach. 
We were awaiting departure on runway 8R on taxiway. Airline aircraft B in 
position on runway holding for takeoff clearance. Flight check aircraft approaching 
runway on final, checking back course approach. Tower advised aircraft B to  hold in 
position. Flight check aircraft continued approach to end of runway at  a low 
altitude, then suddenly deviated downward from flight path and passed over the top 
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of aircraft B, clearing the aircraft by about 20 ft: he then executed a pull-up 
maneuver. Aircraft B was unable t o  see the incident siilce it was approached from 
the rear; our crew felt that an impact was imminent for an instant. . . . 
Pilot procedures, especially visual monitoring procedures. were inadequate i n  seven cases. The 
following examples are typical of the consequences of failure t o  monitor outside the cockpit even 
after receipt of a clearance. 
Airline aircraft B landing on runway 28R; I was landing on 38L. Airline 
aircraft B was told by tower to use taxiway Echo, hold short of 28L. Aircraft B 
didn’t even slow down but just taxiied across 28L in front of me. If he’d looked out  
his window, the captain would very easily have seen me boring down on him . . . he 
should have known from previous conversations with tower that there was traffic on 
28L. .  . . 
* * * 
Aircraft A cleared for ILS to runway 35L. ATIS info, 8 broken 1-1/2 smoke 
and fog. We had the runway at about 500 ft ;  visibility was about a mile. Landing was 
routine; rollout was to the high speed exit opposite the XXX airline terminal. Tower 
cleared out aircraft, A, to cross 25R. ‘‘Ground .75 on other side.” My first officer’s 
response was “Roger.” So I continued m y  roll across 25R. (The clearance was 
verified about the time we entered th, highspeed from 35L.) As the nose of our 
aircraft entered the edge of 25R, aircraft B, taking off, passed over us. The clearance 
could not have been more than 50-75 ft. We had heard no radio clearance or 
conversation whatsoever about activity on  25R, so aircraft B either took off without 
clearance or the runways were being handled on separate frequencies.. . . I must 
accept responsibility for trusting the clearance t o  cross 35R without asking my 
copilot to  verify that we were clear by looking to  the right 1.2 runway 25R. 
Problems relating to  airport lighting and markings appeared in seven reports of pilot- and 
con troller-initiated occurrences. 
Aircraft A was taxied t o  runway 33L via the outer terminal taxiway to hold 
short of Charlie taxiway. When next observed, the aircraft was stopped on the 
centerline of runway 22R, at the approach end of runway 4L. At this time aircraft B 
was starting to rotate on runway 22R about three-fourths of the way down the 
runway. Aircraft A was instructed to taxi straight ahead and clear the runway 
immediately. Controllers feel that field lighting and poorly marked taxiways are the 
prime reasons for this recurring problem. . . . 
* * * 
I called for progressive taxi instructions, notifying the tower that I was 
ui;familiar with the airport. The controller cleared the aircraft to runway 34R. I 
taxied south following the blue lights until the lights turned west toward the 
runway, then turned west, held short, and did my run-up. I called “Ready for 
takeoff,” and the tower cleared me into position to hold. As I took the active, 
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another light aircraft passed me on its takeoff run, deviating to the west side of the 
runway; our wing-tip clearance was about 20-30 ft. I asked what had happened and 
the tower told me that they thought I was at  the end of the runway and thus would 
be behind the departing aircraft. 
I am responsible for the safe operation of my aircraft, and that includes not 
taxiing into the path of a departing aircraft, even if cleared by the tower. However, 
as one high-ranking GAD0 official once said t o  me, “A pilot sometimes gets a lot of 
help going down the tubes.” First, I too thought that I was at the end of 
runway 34R. I had asked, “Do I just follow the blue lights south to the end?” 
Ground control said, “Yes.” When I finally turned west on the taxiway, there were 
no inore blue lights to the south, only to the west (leading to an intersection). As I 
turned west on the taxiway, I saw a sign pointing t o  R34R and R32. . . . As I held 
just east of the hold line, I could see a large painted area on 34R which appeared to  
be the numbers. . . . When I received clearance into position, I looked to my left. I t  
may be difficult to believe that I looked and did not see an aircraft coming toward 
me, but as I reconstruct the matter, I looked up for an aircraft on final . . . I should 
have seen tlie other aircraft, and I bear the responsibility for not having seen it . . . 
however, the tower certainly cleared two aircraft to operate on the same runway at  
the same time. . . . 
* * * 
I was the captain on flight A departing Atlanta. We were cleared to taxi t o  
runway 27L by runway I5 to hold short of runway 26 and 27R and to follow an 
aircraft B. Aircraft B ahead held short of 26 and was then cleared across. I asked the 
first officer to request clearance to  cross with the other aircraft; we were advised to  
hoid short. We were Iiolding short of what I believed at the time to  be the east-west 
taxiway. While holding, I saw landing lights on an airplane C in position at the east 
end of runway 26. At that time I realized 1 had inadvertently crossed the E-W 
taxiway and vas very close to runway 26. I believed we were too close and 
immediately had the first officer alert ground control of our position and need to 
cross. We expedited across the runway when clearance was received. . . . On 
runway 15 in relation t o  the east-west taxiway for runway 26 there is a very large 
concrete area t o  the east of tlie position I was holding . . . much of this area is either 
not lighted or inadequately lighted with respect t o  designating the edge of the 
runway. . . . This area did not provide an adequate reference. . . . 
Other airport problems were cited in ten cases. They included inadequate taxiways, taxiways 
too close to  runways, parallel runways too close to permit holding between them without intruding 
on one or the other, and inadequate maintenance. Two rcports of pilot-initiated occurrences cited 
obstructions to tower visibility; onc is quoted here. 
I was doing touch-and-go practice, and was cleared for touch-and-go 
runway 31. I was informed aircraft B, a wide-body, was to hold short of runway 3 1 .  
He was taxiing from the ramp to runway 6R for takeoff. At any rate, he did not 
hold short. Fortunately, I was practicing zero tlap landings, so niy airspeed was 
higher than usual. As soon as we concluded aircraft B was not going t o  stop, I 
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applied full flaps, full power and made a hard climbing right turn. I missed B by less 
than 100 ft  . . . part of the problem is that the personnel in the old tower cannot see 
the activity on runway 31 north of runway 6L, so they were more or less helpless in 
this situation. . . . 
In summary, pilot-initiated occurrences often involved performing some maneuver without 
clearance (46 of 65 cases). This was often associated with a coordination problem within the 
cockpit or between flight crew and ATC (22 of 46). Pilot disorientation or confusion was noted in 
12  of 65 occurrences. 
Controller-initiated occurrences- These occurrences usually involved failure to  insure that 
separation would exist (74 of 89 cases). In 45 of the 74 cases in this category, there were associated 
coordination problems (with the aircraft in 16 cases, within the tower in 26 cases, and between 
tower and approach control in 3 cases). Inadequate information transfer within ATC is strongly 
associated with controller actions involving failure of separation. 
Inadequacies in coordination among tower personnel (usually between local and groiuid 
con trollers) were associated with serious problems relating t o  runway incursions. Note in the first 
two reports the role of visual monitoring. In the third report, visibility restrictions were a factor, 
though there is no question that visual recognition of the conflict led t o  its resolution. 
At about 12 15 hours, I was cleared for takeoff on runway 25. As 1 approached 
the intersection of runways 25 and 15 during my takeoff roll, aircraft B, which was 
previously facing west, turned toward runway 25 t o  taxi north. As B’s nose neared 
the centerline of the runway my position was 103 ft  or less from the aircraft and 
closing with a speed of 55-60 knots. At this point I rotated (at a slightly premature 
speed) and lifted off. I tuined right at about I O  ft of altitude, avoiding the nose of 
the other aircraft by 10-20 ft. I contacted the tower and was informed that B was 
cleared by ground control and that the ground controller was in error.  . . as a 
secondary cause, the crew of the air carrier aircraft should have looked both ways 
prior to  taxiing onto runway 7-25. 
* * * 
We landed on 23L at (a foreign airport). Tower cleared us t o  turn off on 
taxiway B and contact ground control. Ground control cleared LIS across 
runway 23R t o  our gate via taxiway A. My first officer rogered and we started t o  
cross 23R. He hollered “Stop, somebody is takeoff!” or words t o  that effect. We 
stopped and a corporate jet passed right i n  front of us. Had we moved I O  ft farther 
the smaller jet would have hit us. It appeared he was just breaking ground as he 
passed us. . . . 
* * * 
(From one pilot) We were a (fourengine jct) ferry, cleared t o  taxi froni the 
hangar are3 t o  the iiorthwest runway, 32L, via the active runway parallel taxiway for 
an intersection takeoff a t  T-l , . . the weather was -X 3 3/8 fog, ceiling leVAR39. 
On reaching the intersection we advised ground control and were cleared t o  tower. 
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On initial call, we were number one for takeoff and advised the tower. .  . tower 
cleared us into position and hold. A short time thereafter, tower cleared another 
aircraft to  land. I had taxied onto the runway and was about t o  make the 90” right 
turn when landing lights appeared on the left side. Visibility was restricted. I 
promptly added power to clear the runway instead of turning. I continued straight 
across onto the continuation of T-1 . While waiting for the engines to  spool up after 
throttle application a wide-body in a landing flare appeared with the landing lights 
on and as we cleared the runway while still moving the wide-body passed behind us. 
I cannot say for sure how to detect the fact you have been cleared into position 
in front of a landing aircraft in restricted visibility especially at an airport with 
multiple runway operations.. . . 
(From -the other pilot) We were cleared t o  land by the tower when we reported 
Romeo inbound. Weather reported 2@ 3/8 fog, RVR 3500 approach 3000 middle 
and end of runway. Copilot flying, approach normal. Aboirt 1,000 ft past threshold 
at the point where engineer called 30 ft altitude and at the point where I was taking 
control for touchdown, I saw a heavy jet in the middle of the runway. I applied full 
power for go-around and started climb. Saw the other airplane clearing so cut power 
and landed. Our approach speed was 145 knots, weight a t  landing 478,000 Ib. 
One coordination problem involved a shift change in the tower. 
The visibility was RVR 1200; we had takeoff minimums and were holding 
short on the taxiway. W e  called ready for takeoff and received a takeoff clearance. I 
spooled the engines and started t o  taxi. Just as we started t o  move I caught a glimpse 
of an aircraft passing by and disappearing into the fog on 35R, the runway on which 
we were cleared for takeoff. I checked with tower; he apparently was taken aback 
by the event and was unaware the aircraft existed. He did not have him on radar . . . 
somehow the aircraft, on a Category 11 approach, had gotten lost in the shuffle of 
changing shifts. . . . 
Phraseology problems were associated with five runway incursions. Examples are shown here. 
Arcraft A requested departure clearance on runway 4. I cleared aircraft A for 
takeoff. Aircraft B was advised t o  taxi into position and hold runway 7 for traffic 
departing runway 4. Aircraft A called again for verification of departure clearance. 
Aircraft A was advised, “Cleared for takeoff, minimum delay, traffic awaiting 
departure on runway 7.” I was then momentarily distracted and when I looked up 
both aircraft A and aircraft B were airborne and rapidly converging. I gave aircraft A 
a right turn to avoid traffic. Traffic separated and no further conflict occurred . . . 
the aircraft came within 500 ft of each other . . . I believe a contributing frrctor was 
fatigue. Two of LIS have worked the day shift without a break; even lunch had to  be 
eatcn in position. . . . I am thorouglily bushed, and I still have I hr t o  go. . . . 
* * * 
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Airline aircraft A was told to  round a corner of the departure runway and not 
to  plan on stopping. Traffic, aircraft B, was landing on an intersecting runway. I 
turned my head to look at another of my departure runways and A departed. The 
landing aircraft stopped short of the runway being used for departure and the pilot 
called for an explanation . . . better phraseology should have been used t o  A about 
holding in position. 
ATC and controller procedures were associated with specific problems in 1 1  reports, not all 
involving controller-initiated occurrences. The difficulty posed by a hold-point very close to a 
landing runway was cited in two reports. 
After landing on runway 9, tower cleared us to turn off the runway via Romeo 
and contact ground control.. . . Upon turning off, the after-landing checklist was 
accomplished. As I adjusted the frequency and volume for ground control, I heard 
them calling us to hold our position. We were approximately 1,000 ft  from the 
turnoff point when the captain and I heard ground calling us and when we stopped 
we were in the middle of another active runway (22) and a light airplane was flying 
at, up and over us .  . . the turnoff of runway 9 to 22 is a very short distance and 
narrow, requiring the full attention of the pilot taxiing. There is no ATIS to warn 
the crew of multiple active runways and I do not recall the approach or tower 
controllers advising of th i s . .  . the tower supervisor after the incident advised me 
that this had happened several times previously. . . . 
* * * 
After instrunient approach, on landing rollout runway 5L, tower instructed 
aircraft to turn off on runway 10. Instructions were acknowledged by first officer. 
We changed to ground control and were told t o  hold short of taxiway N. Taxiway N 
occurs near the turnoff so aircraft was almost through N at the time of tlie 
transmission. Ground control told aircraft both he and tower had instructed the 
aircraft to  hold short of N. . . . 
Simultaneous intersecting ILS approaches were cited in one report. 
Aircraft A was established on the ILS course for runway 7. We were advised by 
approach control of traffic at ten o’clock, 4 miles, on an ILS for runway 10. 
Approximately 2 minutes later I inquired about the traffic and was informed he was 
“ten o’clock, 3 miles.” The first officer informed me that the outer marker light had 
started blinking just as we broke out of the clouds and saw the traffic, which seemed 
closer than 3 miles. The distance between the outer markers for runways 7 and 10, 
according to the scale on the approach plate, is just under 2 miles, but the issue is 
not whether we were 3 miles or closer. The real issue is that both aircraft were 
inbound on intersecting localizer courses. To compound the problem, both aircraft 
were at similar airspeeds. The use of simultaneous ILS on intersecting eoiirses might 
seem to be cfficient and safe to ATC, but it  is potentially hazardous. Recaust. of the 
converging courses which it inherently provides, all the ingredients for a midair 
collision lie in wait for a triggering last-minute event: a siniple controller distraction, 
or a coininunications failure, or radio congestion. Procedures should be fail-safe. . . . 
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The control of intersecting patterns by different control positions was discussed in one report 
in this sample (other ASRS reports have also cited this problem). 
I was flying airline aircraft A on the above date. Tower issued takeoff instruc- 
tions and we broke ground off runway 3 5 R .  . . at that time I saw corporate jet  B 
cross directly in front of me, having taken off from runway 27. Upon reaching a safe 
altitude, I asked the tower operator if he was aware that the aircraft were taking off 
simultaneously. He said “No.” Subsequent inquiries. . . indicate that the tower 
personnel felt nothing of significance occurred. I feel that it was highly danger- 
ous.. . . 
A specific procedural problem was cited in several reports, all of which mentioned difficulties 
associated with simultaneous use of intersecting runways. The issue in these and other reports 
concerning these procedures is what happens when a problem is encountered by one or  the other 
aircraft i f  the procedures leave little room for a “fall-back” position. 
Airline captain was cleared t o  land on runway 14L and at the same time tower 
cleared another airline aircraft for takeoff on intersecting runway 27L. We were 
given no warning by approach control or tower of the departing aircraft on the 
intersecting runway. If we had to make a go-around it would have been very close. 
We had made a long landing to  save taxi time, and had to use heavy braking to  avoid 
the intersection. . . . 
* * * 
Tower cleared aircraft A to land on runway 27L and aircraft B to land on 32L 
at the same time. The runways intersect. Had aircraft A not been able to hold short 
of the intersection the two aircraft would have collided. When questioned about the 
practice the tower answered, “I’ve been directed to use the runways in this manner.” 
* * * 
As we were cleared to land on 14L the tower asked us t o  expedite through the 
intersection of 4 L  and we agreed. On touchdown we experienced difficulty with the 
aircraft due to very poor braking action and crosswinds. With this difficulty we did 
not, in fact, expedite through the intersection. I believe the tower was not observant 
as they cleared another aircraft for takeoff on 4 L  before we were through the 
intersection. . . . I personally believe that this runway configuration is undesirable 
unless more attention is paid, and the landing aircraft should not be questioned. One 
week previously, I experienced the same problem departing on 4L. I aborted takeoff 
due to an  aircraft in the intersection of 4L and 14L. 
* * * 
We werc cleared to land on 27R. Another aircraft was cleared for landing on 
22R to hold short of 27R. Both aircraft touched down at nearly the same time. We 
landed normally on 27R but coiild not tell for certain that the aircraft on 22R 
would in fact be able to hold short of the intersection. He did not ever come t o  a 
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full stop because he was playing his taxi t o  expedite traffic (there are no turnoffs on 
22R). We braked to a slow taxi to be certaiii of our clearance and so that we could 
stop if he couldn’t. Tower immediately told us to  expedite off the runway for 
landing traffic. After we turned off a twin and a tri-engine jet touched down on the 
two runways with the same result, only the trimotor braked heavily. This operation 
is unsafe; it adds too many additional variables during the critical landing phase. 
Training was involved in five controller-initiated occurrences. A typical example follows. 
Aircraft A landed on runway 12, then aircraft B was told to  taxi into position 
and hold runway 12, which he did. Aircraft C was on a 3-mile dog-leg to final for 12 
at this time. By the time aircraft A cleared the runway aircraft C was on 1-mile final. 
When aircraft C touched down aircraft B was 3,000 ft  ahead of him and just lifting 
off. Controller training was in progress at the time and the trainee apparently didn’t 
realize it would be that close. By tho time I decided to send aircraft C around it was 
too late; he was already committed to land. The pilot remarked that he should have 
gone around, but he did not. The trainee should either have sent him around or not 
taxied B onto the runway but did not. I should have sent C around but I did not. 
None of us reacted to this situation as we had been trained to  and the result was less 
than standard separation. 
Several of the reports in this sample described situations in which a go-around was initiated by 
the pilot because of a perceived threat to separation. Such an action was taken in 17 cases. In a t  
least some of these, the action produced new problems, although it obviously averted problems in 
other cases. 
We were cleared for immediate takeoff from ‘in position’on runway 31 and 
began our roll without delay. Aircraft B was on final approach to  runway 22. Our 
spacing was slightly less than what we’ve been used to  at this airport, but we felt 
that we had more than adequate separation. During our takeoff roll aircraft B 
initiated a go-around. We crossed the runway intersection at about 300 ft  AGL and 
at  that time B appeared t o  be near level with us and perhaps over the approach 
lights. The fact that he pulled up and possibly accelerated put our aircraft in closer 
proximity than if he had continued his approach and landed. We would not classify 
this as a near miss but the potential exists in this situation. 
* * * 
Aircraft A reported to tower on downwind. I cleared A t o  land. Aircraft B 
called for takeoff. B was cleared for takeoff, then cleared for immediate takeoff and 
given traffic, aircraft A, 1-mile final. A declared the approach too close to departing 
traffic and went around on ‘the riglit si& of the departure. In my opinion if A had 
continued his landing I would have had minimum departure separation. However, 
due t o  the pilot’s initiation of 3 go-around he reduced longitudinal separation and 
passed B at midfield. 
In 20 occurrences, both the pilot and the controller erred in some manner. Eight, o r  4076, of 
these occurrences involved a near collision. These reports were therefore singled out for 
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examination. It was found that these occurrences, like the others in this study, involved a variety of 
factors. One factor noticeable in this subset of reports, however, was very tight spacing of traffic (in 
eight cases) which produced problems when not all participants behaved as expected. Two examples 
follow. In both cases, one or more of the pilots, as well as a controller, contributed t o  the situation. 
Aircraft A, landing 4R, was instructed to  roll to the end. Aircraft B was in 
position runway 8L awaiting the landing A t o  roll through the intersection. Antici- 
pating separation, the controller instructed B to start a fast taxi since there was a 
heavy aircraft C on short final for 8L. Aircraft A slowed and tried to  use a diagonal 
taxiway that saves time to  the gates. Controller instructed A to cross the intersection 
without delay; A did so and takeoff clearance was given to the fast-taxiing B. This 
was not a safe operation by the local controller and will not be tried again. This 
airport is extremely hard to work because of crossing runways and numerous 
intersections for takeoff. . . . In the above incident the two aircraft missed by 300 ft  
or so; too close. . . . 
* * * 
Transport aircraft A taxied out and was holding for takeoff. Another flight had 
landed and was still on the runway. Aircraft A was cleared for something and the 
transmission ended. Only a couple of seconds later, A was cleared into position and 
cleared for takeoff. Just as we were about to  start our takeoff an aircraft B who was 
on final said he was going around. As I made the last 90" turn onto the runway I saw 
lights and he appeared about a mile or  so out on final. When he elected to go around 
I elected not to start my takeoff roll as it appeared that from his position and my 
takeoff and climb we would be very close (visibility was 1 to 1-1/2 miles, ceiling 
about 300 tt). Since I had not started to take off, and since aircraft B was not going 
to  land, I made a right turn back off the runway. Aircraft B said he could land but 
the tower told him to go around, then immediately told him to go ahead and land. 
Aircraft B advised that he would have a moment earlier but he could not at that 
time. In aircraft A, we advised that we would continue with our takeoff and that we 
were starting our takeoff roll. The tower advised to turn left and taxi clear of tlie 
runway. 
There is no taxiway off to  tlie left of the runway except at the very end so we 
did a quick turn and cleared the runway on the east side. As we were clearing, an 
aircraft C was told to go around. The result of this incident was at no time a 
hazardous condition, but it did result in two aircraft having t o  go around . . . air 
traffic was very heavy at the time . . . during these conditions radio communications 
are SO congested that it leads to  misunderstandings and confusion on the part of 
both tlie pilot and the controller. Expediting the situation only adds to the 
confusion. . . . 
In summary, con troller-initiated Occurrences generally involved failure to  insure that separation 
would exist. An important corollary factor was a failure of coordination with 0 t h  tower positions. 
Training may have been a factor in a few cases; procedures may also have been a factor in  some. 
Tight traffic spacing appeared to  be a fxtor  in cases in which a flight crew crror compounded the 
controller's error, or vice versa. 
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Utlzer- fuctors- A number of other factors were also present in and pertinent to these 
occurrences. Environmental factors were cited in 12 cases. Five of these involved restricted 
visibility; in one, the controller’s alertness averted a problem. 
Aircraft A requested taxi clearance from the south ramp to the active runway. 
Visibility was 3/16 mile in ground fog; taxi instructions were given and the RVR for 
runway 10. The aircraft advised he was “slightly unfamiliar” with the airport layout 
and detailed instructions were given. In his taxi, he was required to  cross the active 
runway at midfield. Aircraft B was holding in position for departure and I requested 
A to report crossing runway 15R at taxiway F, a point that is clear of the active 
runway 10. From past progress reports, after a sufficient lapse of time, I asked A for 
a confirmation of his position and was told he had cleared the checkpoint. I had a 
ground vehicle holding clear for the A on yet ancther taxiway and was awaiting his 
report of sighting A. Again, froni A’s past reports and the time lapse, he should have 
passed the ground vehicle, but had not. Unsure of his position, 1 elected t o  advise 
local control to hold his departure. Upon further inquiry, the pilot of A admitted he 
was not sure of his location. B was held until A reported sighting an airline ramp, a 
point known to be clear of the active. . . . 
In a second report, a late hand-off and a missed approach presented the controller with a 
potentially critical situation. 
Aircraft A was on a VOR approach t o  runway 13L and aircraft B was depzrting 
runway 3 1 R with a right turn out northeast-bound. Approach control did not give 
the tower a hand-off on the VOR approach. The weather was marginal with low 
ceiling and the VOR approach called well inside the normal hand-off point, after the 
tower controller had released the VFR 3 1 R departure, not knowing about the 
opposite direction IFR aircraft. Due to  the ceiling coming down, the IFR aircraft 
executed a missed approach. The tower controller separated the aircraft visually by 
seeing aircraft B and climbing aircraft A. . . . 
Intersecting runway operations in wet weather caused another problem. 
Airline aircraft A on short final for landing on runway 12L niadc a touch-and- 
go in order to  pass over aircraft B who, after landing on runway 17, could not hold 
short of the intersection of runway 12L. Runway 17 intersects 12L. 3,000 ft froni 
the approach end. The runways were wet at the time. 
Several reports discussed controller visual problems; in this case, night compounded the 
problem. 
Aircraft A was cleared to land on runway 16 with aircraft €3 cleared for 
touch-and-go on intersecting runway 30R. At the time both clearances were issued, 
judgment and experience indicated standard separation would exist. I t  did not. but 
due to the angles involved, tllis less than standard separation situation was not 
apparent until it was too late to  do anything about it. The situation occurred at 
night, with both aircraft landing toward the tower. As a result, both distance and 
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speed determinations are extremely difficult. . . . The aircraft involved were not that  
close, but it was potentially unsafe. A bright display would have helped here. . . . 
Frequency congestion was a factor in six reports. It was usually cited as a factor that made it 
more difficult to confirm unclear or partially missed instructions. Language problems were cited as 
a factor in four runway incursions; similar flight numbers were a factor in one case. Workload was 
cited as a contributing factor in five occurrences, fatigue as a factor in one. 
When this study was initiated, it was the opinion of the authors that surface vehicles would be 
found to be an important facet of the runway incursion problem. This proved not t o  be the case. 
Motor vehicles were a factor in only 8 of 165 occurrences. 
The driver of a vehicle was the initiator of six of the occurrences. In three cases, the driver 
crossed an aircraft movement area without clearance; the other three involved disorientation or  
confusion as to his position on the part of a driver. The outcome was a collision in one case, less 
than safe separation in one, a recognized error in two, and no conflict in two. In one case, a motor 
velucle wandered onto an airport from outside; the other cases involved airport service vehicles. 
Motor vehicles have been a persistent problem at certain airports that have deficient security 
fencing; however, they did not appear to be a frequent problem in this sample of reports from 
con trolled airports. 
General discussion- What, in summary, can be learned from these data? In particular, do the 
data suggest any measures that might assist in solving the problem of runway incursions, if  these 
occurrences do represent a problem? 
First, while we are uncertain as t o  the magnitude of the problem, it s e e m  certain that a 
problem exists. That some of these near collisions were not accidents instead appears t o  have been 
due to chance alone (the occurrences in which no recovery action was taken are an example). 
Given the existence of the problem, how may it be characterized? The problem appears at first 
glance to  be twofold. One aspect involves pilots who d o  not have, or who niisunderstand, a 
clearance prior to  executing a maneuver. The second aspect involves controllers who fail to  insure 
that separation exists and that it will continue to exist before they issue a clearance. Both problems, 
however, appear in a large number of cases to involve a common factor: lack of information. I n  the 
case of the pilots (and the vehicle operators), the information they lack is a timely, unambiguous 
clearance. In the case of many of the controllers, the information relates t o  their or other traffic, or  
about the intentions of pilots (or drivers). 
In many of these reports, it is clear that considerable pacing stress is involved. The pilot has 
schedule pressures, the need to conserve fuel, and the constant knowledge that he cannot “get there 
by sitting here.”The controller’s problem is more pervasive; he must move traffic, simply because he 
knows there is more coming. One of these reports is illuminating, for it illustrates that controllers will 
sometirnes go further than perhaps they should to  provide whatever services are requcsted of them. 
Aircraft B executing practice ILS 31 L approach t o  a full stop . . . aircraft A 
advised 011 left base with 13 i n  sight. Local control cleared A to  land 31R. . . . local 
control had other distractions and did not continue to watch A ,  . . radar was not 
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painting the aircraft. . . A stated that an aircraft was on the runway;local control 
did not observe an aircraft on 3 I R and checked 3 1 L. I observed A about 20 f t  AGL 
about to  land on top of B. I told A to  go around. As A started his go-around on 3 1 L 
additional traffic was C on short final on runway 36. I told C t o  make an emergency 
pull-up to  avoid A. Contributing factors: poor radar reception and only one local 
control position. Just prior t o  this incident I had worked 107 operations using three 
runways . . . one local controller has difficulty observing all of the critical areas for 
three different traffic patterns. . . . 
Frequency congestion, shortcuts, nonstandard phraseology, unpredictable and unnanounced 
flight crew actions, visibility restrictions, and other factors all play a part in this problem, but it 
appears that the information transfer problem, for whatever reasons, is at the heart of a substantial 
part of it. Given that over half these occurrences involve an aircraft taxiing, and therefore able to 
stop almost at will, it is suggested that it should be productive to examine closely ways to insure 
that taxiing aircraft (and motor vehicles) are under all circumstaiices absolutely certain of what they 
are supposed to be doing. 
There are three facets to this part of the information transfer problem; each is important, but 
the relative importance will vary as a function of geographic features, airport layout, and procedures 
in various locations. 
Standard operating procedures for taxiing, either system-wide or airport-specific, will help t o  
insure compliance with desired patterns of behavior in most cases, if they are known to  all iisers and 
if they are simple enough to be understood. Although steps have been taken t o  clarify taxi clearance 
limitations, it appears from the number of occurrences involving this factor that additional 
attention might be helpful. 
Taxiway lighting and marking appear to be a problem at a number of locations, especially 
during periods of construction or repairs. While many improvements have been made in signs over 
the past several years, markings, especially at  night, still appear to represent a deficiency. The 
problem is most acute at  the junctions of taxiways with runways. 
Clearances were a problem in a number of reports, particularly when ground control fre- 
quencies were congested. The dangers of nonstandard or abbreviated clearances are clear; niaintain- 
ing clearance discipline under severe time constraints, however, is a constant struggle. One pertinent 
location-specific situation noted several timcs in the study involved being directed t o  “follow 
another aircraft,” then uncertainty as to whether t o  follow the other aircraft across an active 
runway. Some pilots did, some pilots did not, and some pilots queried ground control for 
clarification. It is this sort of ambiguity the system should seek to  avoid. 
Lack of clearance for takeoff or landing was noted in 14 reports. This can hardly be due to  a 
lack of knowledge of the requirements for such a clearance. Data regarding the four aircraft that 
landed without clearance indicate two were not in contact with the tower; the reasons why the 
otlicr two landed are unknown. 111 the case of takeoffs without clcarance, however, a pattern was 
more evident. In  7 of I O  cases, an aircraft took off immediately after a takeoff clearance was 
delivered to another aircraft. One case involved siniilar flight numbers, one involved an incomplete 
(no aircraft identification) repeat of a previously issucd takeoff clearance, after which two aircraft 
took off simultaneously on intersecting runways. I n  the other cases. the reason for takeoff was 
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unknown in one, a probable language problem in a second, and a crew member’s misinterpretation 
of a question from the other pilot in the third. 
The tone of several of these reports suggests that pilots already in position and awaiting 
takeoff clearance may have heard what they expected t o  hear, without recognizing that the 
clearance was for another aircraft on another (or even the same) runway. It is in this subset of cases 
that devices for visual confirmation of takeoff clearance would be useful, but it is also suggested 
that with the mu1 tiple-runway and intersection takeoff operations, which characterize nearly all of 
our busier airports, a heightened level of caution on the part of pilots, perhaps accompanied by a 
readback of the flight or aircraft numbers in acknowledgment of the clearance, might accomplish 
the same thing. 
I t  is clear that problems in coordination between local and ground controllers are a factor in a 
substantial number. of runway incursions. It is equally clear that pacing stress is a contributinz 
factor in these and probably in other failures of coordination. Though a recent FAA directive 
mandating verbal coordination prior to permitting the crossing of one of two active parallel runways 
may be of help, a recent ASRS report describes the difficulties associated with implementing this 
directive at an extremely busy VFR tower serving a multiple parallel runway operation. 
Conclusions 
The following conclusions are drawn : 
1. Incursions of aircraft onto runways at controlled airports represents a significant safety 
problem 
2. An important factor in both pilot-initiated and controller-initiated runway incursions is 
failure of information transfer among the relevant system participants 
3. Taxiing aircraft, a major con tributor to these occurrences, represent the most effective 
single point of attack on the problem, if ASRS data are represcntative. 
